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Abstract
Nakamoto protocol, practically solving the Byzantine Generals Problem, can
support a variety of proof-based consensus engines, referred to as Proof-of-X
(PoX) in permissionless Blockchains. However, there has been to date in lack
of a general approach for each miner to evaluate its steady-state profit against
the competitors. This paper presents a Markov model which captures explic-
itly the weighted resource distribution of PoX schemes in large-scale networks
and unifies the analysis of different PoX schemes. The new model leads to
the development of three new unified metrics for the evaluation, namely, Re-
source Sensitivity, System Convergence, and Resource Fairness, accounting for
security, stability, and fairness, respectively. The generality and applicability
of our model are validated by simulation results, revealing that among typ-
ically non-Fairness-oriented PoX schemes (such as Proof-of-Work (PoW) and
Proof-of-Stake (PoS)), the strongly restricted coinage-based PoS with a Pareto-
distributed resource can offer the best performance on Resource Sensitivity,
while Proof-of-Publication (PoP) with normal-distributed resource performs the
best on System Convergence. Our simulations also reveal the important role of
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carefully designed Resource Fairness parameter in balancing Resource Sensi-
tivity and System Convergence and improving the performance compared with
other non-Fairness-oriented PoX schemes.
Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Nakamoto protocol, Proof-of-X schemes,
Markov chain
1. Introduction
Nakamoto protocol in Bitcoin [1] was proposed to address the Byzantine
Generals Problem [2] other than the traditional Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(BFT) protocol. The consensus engine of the Nakamoto protocol was first pro-
posed as Proof-of-Work (PoW), and has been extended to other virtual-mining-5
based variations (e.g., Proof-of-Stake (PoS) ) and subsequently generalized to
Proof-of-X (PoX)-based consensus algorithms [3, 4]. PoX schemes take advan-
tage of probabilistic consensus algorithms, and introduce a publicly Verifiable
Random Function (p-VRF) with only communication overhead of O(N) (N is
the number of miners). Along with the PoX schemes have been widely adopted10
in a variety of applications (such as Proof-of-Collaboration (PoC) [5] and Proof-
of-Distribution (PoD) [6] in Internet-of-Things systems), as well as the compar-
ison between BFT schemes and PoX schemes becoming attractive [7, 8, 9], the
studies on PoX schemes become increasingly interesting for large-scale networks.
In PoX schemes, the computation resource used in PoW can be replaced15
using any other publicly-verifiable system resources with customized parameters
(e.g., account balance/coinage in PoS and task progress in PoC), as long as
the p-VRF can hold. Several recent papers analyzed the PoW, PoS and their
variations [10, 11, 12, 13], but none of them was able to evaluate the long-term
steady state of the system and the impact of the distribution of system resource20
on the state. There also lacks a general analytical model for PoX schemes. Such
a model would be important to enable each miner to estimate its profit against
competitors based on its source. This is important for the traditional mining
industry [14] and any public services based on permissionless Blockchains.
2
In this paper, we propose a new unified analytical model which is able to25
quantify the profit of individual miners in any of the popular permissionless
PoX-based Blockchains. By applying the model, miners can estimate their
profit against their resources under different PoX schemes. The new model cap-
tures proposed changes in the system resource distribution of PoX schemes by
designing an infinite-dimensional Markov chain. A set of expressions is estab-30
lished to efficiently evaluate the mining probability of a miner, given the amount
of system resource owned by the miner. The type and distribution of system
resources can be customized in line with system requirements.
We develop a new general presentation to unify a variety of system resource
distributions in PoX schemes, such as PoW, PoS, and Proof-of-Publication35
(PoP). Specifically, we characterize probabilistically the system resource owned
by a miner. The instantaneous probability with which the miner can mine
a block at any instant is generalized to be captured by two new configurable
functions respectively accounting for the specific fairness measures of a PoX
scheme and the dependence of mining success on the resource distributions in40
the scheme.
We also design three new performance metrics, namely, Resource Sensi-
tivity, System Convergence, and Resource Fairness, to evaluate the different
PoX-based consensus algorithms systematically and consistently. The metrics
are quantifiable based on the average mining probabilities that the proposed45
infinite-dimensional Markov model is able to derive under the new unified mea-
sure of system resource distributions.
As revealed by our analysis, in PoX-based consensus algorithms where the
monopoly of block generation is prevented and diversity is maintained, miners
can maximize the profits with strong double-spending-resistance and control-50
lable cost-risk assessment, thereby contributing to a healthy and sustainable
mining ecosystem. Specifically, the system resource has the weakest impact on
the average mining probability for each participating miner when a configurable
function delivering positive correlation takes effects, which leads to the best Re-
source Sensitivity. Better System Convergence can be achieved in PoX schemes55
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with normal-distributed system resource than that with a Pareto-distributed
system resource, unless the schemes are designed to restrict the monopoly of
block generation. Good fairness or balanced resources play important roles
in fast convergence. The proposed fairness function can be implemented in a
distributed manner, to improve the fairness between miners and speed up the60
convergence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the pre-
liminary knowledge. In Section 3, a Markov analytical model is presented. The
considered network setting is also discussed in Section 4, followed by the sim-
ulation and analysis on different existing PoX-based consensus algorithms in65
terms of three proposed metrics in Section 5. Section 6 reviews related works.
In Section 7, conclusions are drawn.
2. Preliminary
In this section, the security model considered in Bitcoin is discussed to il-
lustrate the relationship between Bitcoin’s security model and our proposed70
metric, Resource Sensitivity, as will be shown in Section 3.4.1. A hybrid PoW-
based consensus is introduced, as it inspires the design of the proposed Degree
function, and can be regarded as a origin of the PoX scheme.
2.1. Bitcoin’s Security Model
In Bitcoin’s model [1], security is measured by the probability δ with which
an attacker can catch up with the loyal miners to dominate the block generation.









where p denotes the probability of a loyal node being the current block gener-75
ator and q denotes the probability of a malicious node being the current block
generator. p > q, λ = z qp , and k ≤ z, where z denotes how much the malicious
node falls behind the loyal miners in terms of block height.
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Table 1: Expressions of (non-)Fairness-oriented PoX schemes
Non-Fairness-oriented, let Υ(ωi) = ωi






























Fairness-oriented, let Υ(ωi) = ζ(ωi), where ζ(ωi) can be defined to be partitioned





Proof-of-Stake-Velocity [19] Account Coinage PD αζi(ωi)µ(min{h,H})
† The type of distribution a set of system resource expected to follow is dependent to the
considered PoX scheme shown in the first column (see the detail in Section 5.1).




2.2. PoX-based Consensus Algorithms
PoW is generalized to the PoX scheme. The PoX scheme describes a system80
where a unique miner is elected to generate a new block based on a publicly








, γi → ωi, (1)
where Pwini is the probability of Node-i being elected as the generator of the85
block, and ωi is the amount of system resource owned by Node-i.
∑
ωi is the
total amount of system resources across the network, e.g., computation power,
token balance, etc.
Function F(·) denotes a p-VRF applied during the consensus process to
randomly select the block generator, subject to the distribution of Pwini , as given90
in (1). Therein, F(·) and γi can be customized to meet different requirements,
and γi is used to adjust how much impact is ωi having on Pwini (denoted as
γi → ωi). For example, a hybrid of PoW and PoP [6] defines γ to be the
number of packets that a particular miner has distributed and forwarded, which
can accordingly decrease the difficulty to win the puzzle-solving race.95
In order to select the block generator in a large-scale network with an un-
known network size in practice, a PoX-based algorithm can be any consensus
algorithm subject to the Longest Chain Rule [4] that leverages a p-VRF based
on any verifiable system resource. We consider two different types of system re-
sources. They are 1) system resources which are independent to its transmission100
bandwidth (typically, this type implies that the the considered system resource
ratio in (1) does not take the transmission bandwidth into account, and this
type of resource can be considered independently without network connection);
and 2) network resource (typically, the transmission bandwidth corresponds to
the network performance). Such algorithm includes, but is not limited to, the105
consensus algorithms listed in Table 1. For example, [6] considers ωi as the total
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amount of system resource that a specific miner i owns, part of which is γi in the
form of the number of distributed packets. F(·) can be a height-oriented factor
in Proof-of-Stake-Velocity (PoS-Velocity) [19], e.g., a function with variables ωi
and γi → h (indicating Pwini is height-oriented with positive correlation). In110
other words, the longer it has been since the last time a miner was elected as
the block generator, the more likely the miner is elected as the block generator
in the current round.
The following model is proposed to generalize (1) based on an infinite-
dimensional Markov chain. It can be used to describe the PoX-based consensus115
algorithms in a long-term stable system, in order to evaluate the distribution of
the mining winners, and predict the cost-benefit ratio.
3. New Infinite-Dimensional Markov Chain Model for PoX Schemes
In this section, we first provide an overview of the proposed model along
with its network settings followed by the detail of the model. The proposed120
metrics, Resource Sensitivity, System Convergence, and Resource Fairness will
be elaborated.
3.1. Overview
For illustration convenience, we consider large-scale synchronous Blockchain
networks with reference to the settings of [20] (that at most one miner can125
successfully mine a block within a time slot). We further consider a sparse
Blockchain system in which the value of tT is sufficiently small and negligible
with t denoting the block propagation delay and T denoting the block period.
Also, we consider attack strategies which are resource-oriented, where attackers
mainly leverage the double spending attacks and selfish mining to maliciously130
rollback the history based on their current dominated system resource ratio.
The analytical model is designed for analyzing the long-term steady-state
(i.e., the probability of each state can be predicted as the system becomes stable)
of PoX-based consensus algorithms. This is achieved by considering the resource
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distribution that is weighed by a Degree function and a Fairness function (which135
will be defined in Section 3.3.2). The analytical model features an infinite-
dimensional Markov chain to investigate the long-term steady state. We also
propose three metrics, namely, Resource Sensitivity, System Convergence, and
Resource Fairness (which will be defined in Section 3.4), for evaluation and
simulation. To be specific, a generalized form of Pwini,γ (the probability of Node-140
i elected to be the block generator in a particular round) can be obtained, Pi.
By using Pi, we can evaluate the PoX-based consensus algorithms in terms of
the proposed metrics - Resource Sensitivity, System Convergence, and Resource
Fairness.
3.2. System Model - Small-slotted mechanism145
In this section, we describe the system model. The notations used are listed
in Table 2.
Our proposed analytical model starts with a small-slotted system, where the
period of any miner mining a block is denoted as a “round”, while a “miner”
denotes any node participating in the race to win for the block generator of150
each round. Each round refers to a block height number and is divided into
many small time slots. The number of time slots contained in a round depends
on the expected block period, i.e., T . Each of the slots lasts a constant short
time. The gap between two consecutive slots can be reduced to satisfy the
assumption referred to [20]. This assumption is reasonable as we can make the155
slots arbitrarily small; see Fig. 1.
Each miner can potentially generate a new block on block height n, based on
the amount of its system resources, as can be done by evaluating (1). In some
PoX schemes, such as coinage-based PoS and PoS-Velocity, (1) can be affected
by the awaiting gap h of each miner, with an upper bound H. The awaiting160
gap is the gap between the considered miner being the elected generator from
the last round to present. There exist the following three possible scenarios for
a miner within a slot.
1. Scenario 1: None of the miners mines a valid block in the network.
8
Table 2: Parameters of the analytical model
Symbols Description
h Awaiting gap that is miner-specific, the gap since the last round
a designated miner being the winner until it wins again?.
Φ(·) A Degree function measuring the impact of h on fi,h
Υ(·) A Fairness function defining whether the monopoly of system re-
source can be avoided
ωi The amount of system resource owned by Node-i
N The number of miners among the entire network
H The upper bound of h
α A constant network parameter, normalizing the mining probabil-
ity fi,h in terms of the size of a time slot
Pr(x|y) The transition probability from awaiting gap y to awaiting gap x
R The mining probability of the entire network per slot
fi,h The mining probability of Node-i per slot at awaiting gap-h
π(h) The steady probability of a miner at awaiting gap-h in an arbitrary
slot
Ti The average number of awaiting gap for Node-i being the winner
since its last winning
Pi A generalized form of Pwini,γ in (1) based on the proposed model
t The block propagation time
T The expected value of block period (round)
? This can be any level of grain. For example, it can be block-height-oriented (in terms of
the block height), as shown in Section 5 or time-oriented [5]. Alternatively, it can be a





















round ( T )
Figure 1: The small-slotted mechanism divides a round into multiple slots. The number of
slots contained in a round is subject to the expected value of the block period T .
2. Scenario 2: This miner does not mine its own block but accepts a block165
mined by another miner;
3. Scenario 3: This miner mines a block, and the block is immediately ac-
cepted by other miners at the beginning of next slot, prior to the mining
for the next round;
3.3. The Proposed Analytical Model170
To clarify Scenarios 1-3 in Section 3.2, we present an infinite-dimensional
Markov chain. For simplicity, Pr(·) denotes the simple form of Pr(i, ·) for Node-
i; π(·) denotes the simple form of πi(·) for Node-i.
3.3.1. The infinite-dimensional Markov chain
175
Let Pr(x|y) denote the transition probability of an individual node/miner from
awaiting gap y to the awaiting gap x at two consecutive slots. The transition
10
probability at Node-i can be given by
Pr(h|h) = 1−R; (2a)
Pr(h+ 1|h) = R− Pr(1|h); (2b)
Pr(1|h) =

fi,h, if 1 < h ≤ H;
fi,H , if h > H;
1−R+ fi,h, if h = 1;
0, otherwise.
(2c)
In (2), R denotes the mining probability of the whole network at a slot. We
consider R is consistent over time, as it must take some k slots for miners to180
generate a new block for a specific round, while k depending on a constant T
can also be considered to be constant in the long term. Recall that h is miner-
specific (and is the simple form of hi). h is not the actual height of the chain,
but the awaiting gap which can be block-height-oriented (see Table 2), between
the previous round where a miner being the block generator and the current185
round where the same miner being selected again.
In (2), a miner running at an awaiting gap h within the considered slot
behaves either in the following way.
• Eq. (2a) refers to Scenario 1. It provides the transition probability that
no new block is mined in the network during this time slot. Thus, the190
miner is still at the awaiting gap h in the next slot.
• Eq. (2b) refers to Scenario 2. It provides the transition probability that
this miner does not generate a new block, and a new block generated by
another miner is finalized. Thus its awaiting gap h increases by 1, with a
probability of R− Pr(1|h).195
• Eq. (2c) refers to Scenario 3. It provides the transition probability that
the miner is elected as the block generator to finalize a new block. Thus,
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its awaiting gap h returns to 1, with a probability of fi,h if 1 < h ≤ H.
Otherwise, fi,H remains unchanged if h > H with an upper bound H set.
With an increasingly comparable network latency t, the probability of final-200
izing a valid block per unit time (the slot time) decreases. This leads to a larger
average number of slots contained in a round due to the increasing likelihood of
forks per slot time, which results in a slower block period; see (2). The deviation
(decreased probability of the generation of a valid block per slot time) implicitly
captures the impact of network delay in practical asynchronous networks on the205
overall mining process and block miming at block-n. Intuitively, the deviation
depends on the value of tT . The probability of finalizing a valid block per slot
time incur deviation away from the estimated one derived from our model as tT
increases. In such way, the deviation can correspond to the value of tT .
To simplify and satisfy the small-slotted mechanism, we consider a small210
t
T where t denotes the propagation delay and T denotes the expected block
period (more details in Section 4.1). Thus the miners avoid needing to consider
forking, and have sufficient time to mine a potential unique block at the same
block height-n among all received block at height-(n-1). With the help of a
game-theoretic incentive scheme [1], the miners are willing to be consistent215
with each other about the finalized block for the current round (the block is
broadcast and accepted by all miners), e.g., based on the difficulty defined in
Bitcoin [1] or Ethereum [21]. In other words, this situation can be interpreted
to a small-slotted mechanism with sufficiently small and negligible tT , i.e., the
first generated block can be finalized and accepted by all miners immediately to220
reach the consensus, and consistency can be satisfied by the end of this round.
Thus, the infinite-dimensional Markov Chain satisfies our proposed small-slotted
mechanism, hence Scenarios 1-3 as defined above can hold. As a consequence
































Figure 2: The state transition of the proposed infinite-dimensional Markov chain at Node-i.
fi,h is denoted as fh for simplicity.
3.3.2. The per-miner-per-slot mining probability fi,h
According to (2c), fi,h provides the per-slot mining probability of Node-i at
awaiting gap-h. fi,h depends on other nodes. It reflects the system resource
distribution of a specific node, Node-i, at the state with the awaiting gap h. We230
propose the following expression for fi,h to unify it for a range of popular PoX
schemes:
fi,h = αΥ(ωi)Φ(h,H) ≤ R. (3)
Here, Υ(·) and Φ(·) are defined as the Fairness function and Degree function,
respectively.235
• Fairness function indicates whether the weighted resource distribution is
Fairness-oriented, and how Resource Fairness affects the weighted resource
distribution if any.
• Degree function can be customized in terms of the awaiting gap h, along
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with an upper bound H. It measures how much the awaiting gap impacts240
on the resource distributed to each miner, in turn, the probability that a
miner is elected to be the block generator.
For example, Υ(ωi) = ωi indicates an inactive Fairness function, while Υ(·) can
be a partition function if fi,h is Fairness-oriented (so that the impact from a high
ωi to fi,h can be restrictive). α is a network-level parameter normalizing the245
probability and accounting for the size of a time slot. Φ(·) can be either equal
to 1 (an inactive Degree function), or customized depending on the awaiting
gap h and an upper bound H. For example, Φ(·) = min{h,H} (a positive
Degree function that delivers a positive correlation of fi,h and h), outputting
the minimum value between the current h and H, is used in the existing PoS250
consensus algorithm [18]. The expressions for fi,h under currently popular PoX
schemes are shown in Table 1.
3.3.3. Steady-state probability
In this section, the steady-state probability of a miner at awaiting gap-h at an
arbitrary slot is evaluated. The steady-state probability, denoted by π(h), can
be calculated in three cases, i.e., h = 1, 1 < h ≤ H and h > H. We consider
that any fi,h with awaiting gap ∀h > H, equals to fi,h. π(h) can be derived
based on (2) as follows.
In the case of 1 < h ≤ H:
The steady-state probability π(h) can be given by
π(h) = Pr(h|h− 1)π(h− 1) + Pr(h|h)π(h)
= (R− fi,h−1)π(h− 1) + (1−R)π(h), 1 < h ≤ H,
(4)
255
which is derived from (2). In particular, π(h) is equal to the sum of the prob-
abilities, 1) that Scenario 2 happens given that the considered node is on the
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awaiting gap h − 1, i.e., Pr(h|h − 1)π(h − 1); and that 2) Scenario 1 happens
given that the considered node is on the awaiting gap h, i.e., Pr(h|h)π(h).










, 1 < h ≤ H, (5b)
where (5b) is obtained by recursively substituting π(h−1) with π(h−1), π(h−2),
· · ·, π(2) into the right-hand side of (5a).
In the case of h > H:
The steady-state probability π(h) can be given by
π(h) = Pr(H + 1|H)π(h− 1) + Pr(h|h)π(h)
= (R− fi,h)π(h− 1) + (1−R)π(h), h > H, (6)
which is also derived from (2). In particular, π(h) is equal to the sum of the260
probabilities that, 1) Scenario 1 happens given that the considered node is on
the awaiting gap h, i.e., Pr(h|h)π(h); and that 2) Scenario 2 happens given that
the considered node is on the awaiting gap h− 1, i.e., Pr(H + 1|H)π(h− 1).
Note that in our proposed model, there exist the states with h > H in which
the probability of Scenario 2 is unchanged (i.e., Pr(H + 1|H)). The probability265
that the miner of interest has an awaiting gap H can be interpreted as an
accumulation of all π(h) with h > H, i.e., limh→∞
∑h
x=H+1 π(x).


















, h > H, (7b)
where (7a) can be converted π(h) to multiple of π(H), and (7b) is obtained by
substituting π(H) into (5b).
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In the case of h = 1:
As limh→∞
∑h
x=1 π(x) = 1, we can add up π(h) in all the three cases, i.e.,
h = 1, 1 < h ≤ H, and h > H, as given by








































































, h = 1. (9)
Consequently, π(h) can be derived with (5), (7) and (9) for any awaiting gap270
h in the cases with 1 < h ≤ H, h > H, and h = 1.
3.3.4. Relation between the total per-slot mining probability R and the per-slot
mining probability of an individual node fi,h
Recall the mining probability of the entire network per slot, R, as given in (2).










where πi(x) denotes the steady-state probability of Node-i with the awaiting275
gap x, and πi(x) can be obtained by substituting (3) into (5) and (7).
By using (5) and (7), the total per-slot mining probability R can be expanded































Therefore, R can be calculated with (11), where πi(1) is the corresponding280
steady-state for Node-i with awaiting gap-1; therefore, πi(1) = π(1). π(1) is
given in (9).
3.3.5. Generalization of Pwini,γ
Recall that Pwini,γ is the probability of Node-i being elected as the block gener-285
ator. We derive Pi which generalizes Pwini,γ in terms of fi,h for PoX schemes.
By using such generalized form, γ is abstracted into the configurable functions
(Fairness function and/or Degree function) of fi,h for any Node-i. As such,
any miners can obtain the probability being elected as the block generator by
calculating fi,h.290
We define Ti as the block generation rate of Node-i. It is measured by the
average number of awaiting gaps required for the miner to be elected again.
For simplicity of notation, we let fi,h = αΥ(ωi)Φ(h,H) = αiΦ(h,H), where
αi = αΥ(ωi) and α is a network parameter normalizing the probability. This
operation is reasonable as the Degree function Φ(·) can equal to 1 and be ignored295
for some PoX schemes (e.g., PoW), while we can realize αi is (non-)Fairness-
17































































x=0(1−R)x = 1/R, and it indicates that no new block has
been finalized in the last k slots of the current round. π(x)π(1) fi,x is the probability
that the awaiting gap of Node-i starts at the height of x. Here, π(x) is divided300
by π(1) to eliminate the effect of the initial state (i.e., h = 1).
As a result, Ti can be calculated based on (5) to (11), and the given {αi, Υ(·),
Φ(·)}. Since Ti is the generation rate of Node-i (i.e., how many awaiting gaps on
average a miner needs to wait until it can be elected as the block generator since
the last time it was elected), the generalized form of Pwini,γ in (1), Pi = 1/Ti.305
3.4. Proposed Evaluation Metrics
Based on the proposed analytical model and the resulting Pi in (12) and (13),
we propose three important metrics to evaluate PoX schemes, i.e., Resource
Sensitivity, System Convergence, and Resource Fairness. Currently popular
PoX-based consensus algorithms, as summarized in Table 1, can all be evaluated310
by using the proposed metrics.
3.4.1. Resource sensitivity
The proposed Resource Sensitivity evaluates the correlation between the system
resource ratio ωi∑ωi , and the average probability of Node-i being the elected as
18
the block generator, Pi.
For any PoX scheme, we have Pi = f(z), where z = ωi/
∑
ωi. The gradi-









f(z)dz, ∀g ≥ 0.
We define Zero-Resource-Sensitivity if g = 1; Positive-Resource-Sensitivity if g
> 1; and Negative-Resource-Sensitivity if 0 ≥ g < 1. Zero-Resource-Sensitivity315
indicates the mining probability Pi is proportional to the resource ratio in a 1:1
ratio. The 50% is the resource ratio with which this node can launch the double-
spending attack in a Zero-Resource-sensitive context (1:1 ratio). A positive
sensitivity leads to a larger impact to Pi by the resource ratio, while a negative
one leads to a smaller impact to Pi. We also assert the relationship between320
Resource Sensitivity and the security of a PoX scheme, i.e., the smaller E(z) is,
the less Resource-sensitive it can achieve, thus a more secure PoX scheme that
has better performance on Resource sensitivity.
By referring to the security model proposed in Bitcoin’s whitepaper [1], se-
curity is specified to be the probability that an attacker could catch up with325
loyal miners in some consecutive rounds. It is closely dependent on the prob-
ability that an attacker potentially wins the puzzle race and generates a ma-
licious block, as captured by our proposed Pi. For example, Pi of traditional
PoX schemes, e.g., PoW and PoS, leads to a Zero-Resource-Sensitivity with
fi,h = αωi, Υ(ωi) = ωi, and Φ(·) = 1 (which is the identity line illustrated330
as the dark blue solid line in Fig. 6). This consequently indicates that Pi in-
creases along with the system resource in a 1:1 ratio, i.e., E(z) = 1 (i.e., an
isosceles right triangle. Here “1” represents a normalized area.), hence more
Resource-sensitive and less secure than those with E(z) < 1.
Resource Sensitivity is complementary to the Bitcoin’s security model, in335
terms of the correlation between the system resource ratio and the average
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probability of any node being the block generator. Such definition of Resource
Sensitivity based on the resource distribution is reasonable, as influential at-
tack strategies (e.g., selfish mining and double-spending attack) depend on the
resource distribution.340
3.4.2. System convergence
The entire system takes rounds to reach the steady-state, while the steady-state
is satisfied if both (4) and (6) hold. Thus, System Convergence is evaluated by
the number of rounds needed to reach steady-state.345
Here, the gap between the theoretical value of Tn (driven by (12)), and
the simulation one (obtained by the Monte Carlo-based simulation) is upper
bounded by a chosen tolerance (the steady-state is reached if the tolerance is
satisfied). The tolerance is chosen as ∼ 3% (see Fig. 4). This is because the PoX
schemes considered in Table 1 have a margin of error of 3% (the y-axis of Fig. 4)350
while the ratio of system resource owned by an arbitrary node fi,h ' 50% (the
x-axis of Fig. 4). This satisfies the requirement of the fault tolerance (FT) of
PoX-based consensus algorithms, N > 2f + 1 (N denotes the total number of
participating miners; f denotes the number of malicious miners).
A stable Pi can be useful for each individual miner to estimate the profits355
more accurately, while an unstable consensus algorithm does not provide such
benefits in the absence of a steady-state. As a result, System Convergence can
be an important metric for rational users who tend to run more controllable
PoX schemes. They will be able to observe how much longer they need to
wait until the entire system becomes stable and predictable with high precision,360
so that a more controllable cost-risk assessment can be conducted. Here, a
more controllable cost-risk assessment implies that, the faster a system becomes
stable, the earlier users obtain an accurate profit estimation, thus the users can
be more thoroughly prepared for all possible financial challenges. Moreover,
we prove the model realistic with System Convergence in a real-world system365
based on the simulation in Section 5.2.1. The simulation reveals that our model
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can provide reasonably accurate estimation of the number of rounds in the real
world, especially in a well-connected network with low latency.
3.4.3. Resource fairness
370
Resource Fairness [22] is defined as an indicator that indicates (in the case of
E(z) < 1) whether there exists a threshold η with respect to the resource ratio, to
the right-hand-side of which g → 0 based on the corresponding Fairness function
Υ(·).
The asymptotically zero gradient (g → 0) provides Resource Fairness against375
a wealthy, resourceful node (i.e., Fairness-orientation). Here, a wealthy node has
at least 50% resource ratio, with which this node can launch the double-spending
attack in a Zero-Resource-sensitive context (1:1 ratio).
Resource Fairness is a specific requirement of a PoX-based consensus algo-
rithm. It prevents monopolization of wealthy miners, and incentivizes all miners380
to participate in the mining process. The miners are expected to voluntarily
apply Fairness function because of the similar reason how miners remain decen-
tralized among centralized mining pools [23]1. Resource Fairness has an impact
on Resource Sensitivity by narrowing down the gap between the lowest and
highest Pn with an unchanged value of H. Resource Fairness also affects Sys-385
tem Convergence by introducing a many-to-one function with respect to h, e.g.,
a partition function ζ(·) in Section 5. As such, the Fairness function Υ(·) = ζ(·)
can significantly decrease the number of rounds to reach the steady-state; see
Fig. 7 for further details.
1The loss caused by a double-spending attack launched by a centralized mining pool will
make the participated miners migrated out. Similarly, miners are expected to voluntarily
prevent the monopoly by restricting the wealthy when they are rich enough.
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4. Consideration on Network Setting390
4.1. Sparse Blockchain Networks
Our model, using the similar assumption of [20] , i.e., a well-connected net-
work with a small tT , and
∑
ωforkedi
ω is also negligible with a constant
∑
ω. A
small tT also contributes to a negligible orphan rate, giving attackers no op-
portunities to exploit any attack strategies on the orphans; refer to [8, Section395
IX-A].
Forking is purposely prevented when every miner mines on a new block
with the same block height, and the assumption of a zero propagation time t is
subject to the following reasons.
For the PoW schemes, the de facto probability that a forked block is mined400
and inserted is also (apart from Pwini,γ ) directly proportional to,
1. the ratio between t and T , i.e., tT ;
2. the ratio of computation resource
∑
ωforkedi working on a block that would
be an orphan one, to the total resource ω; i.e.,
∑
ωforkedi
ω (the chain quality
proposed in [20, 13]).405
The upper bound of time consumption to finalize a new block, δ, becomes
unpredictable as tT → 1. This means the synchronization becomes looser so
that the performance and security of PoW deteriorates. Thus, as we consider
1. tT approaches zero (the throughput is not considered here);
2. rational miners are incentivized to wait until the finalized block of the410
current round is consistently accepted across the whole network before
mining the next block, 2
∑
ωforkedi
ω can be negligible in our model.
2In this paper, we consider that the attackers do not behave maliciously at the time when
the honor miners are waiting for the consistency while T becomes large. When t
T
→ 0, T > δ,
the partially synchronous network can be thought to be completely synchronous, in turn,
satisfies the proposed small-slotted mechanism.
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For the PoS and other PoX schemes without the computation resource, pun-
ishment mechanisms (such as the Slashers in Ethereum 2.0 [24] or the Verifiable415
Delay Function (VDF) [25]) are applied to miners who mine multiple blocks on
the same height to prevent Nothing-at-stake and long-range attacks. In the case
that tT approaches zero,
∑
ωforkedi
ω is also negligible.
4.2. Large-scale Blockchain Networks
The proposed model is designed for a large-scale Blockchain network with420
N potential miners competing for the role of block generator. We define a
finite scale of an upper bound of the awaiting gap h, i.e., N > H. This is
reasonable and usually implemented in PoS-Velocity [19]. Similar designs have
also been implemented to prevent coins hoarding. This is a critical issue of
traditional coinage-based PoS. Attackers hoard the coins on multiple accounts425
with infinite H to boost the success probability [3]. On the other hand, it
is practical to implement an upper bound so that the physical operation can
be more affordable due to the worst-case searching complexity of O(NH) for
traversing the awaiting gaps of all N miners in the entire network.
5. Simulation and Evaluation430
In this section, we present the simulation and evaluation, based on Resource
Sensitivity, System Convergence, Resource Fairness of our proposed analytical
model of the considered PoX schemes listed in Table 1.
5.1. Framework
The simulation setting is presented in the following.435
Hardware setting: A 2017 iMac with 10.13.3 macOS High Sierra, a processor
of 2.3GHz Intel Core i5 and 16 GB 2133 MHz DDR4 memory are used.
Software setting: We carry out a Monte Carlo simulation using Python-2.7
to conduct the mining process given N , H, and α = 12H
∑
ωi
, to obtain the
simulated value of Pi for Node-i. The calculated value of Pi for Node-i based440
on (13) is obtained by using Matlab-2017. Here, the values of N , H, and α are
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set based on the hardware performance.
Samples setting: The parameter fi,h for each of the PoX-based consensus
algorithms is described in Table 1, given the distribution of {αi}. Here, a
coinage-based PoS with a strong restriction implies that the awaiting gap of an445
elected generator starts from 0 (zero probability of being elected consecutively),
while a weak restriction starts from non-zero.
In this simulation, we use a normal distribution and a Pareto distribution for
the resource distribution among the miners, with normal-distributed wealth in-
equality and 80/20-rule-based wealth inequality, respectively. Any PoX scheme450
where miners need to put great efforts, e.g., computational power and token
values, in winning the race results in a Pareto Distribution [26], while it is
normal-distributed if the system resource becomes less costly to the system re-
source among the miners, e.g., PoP. As such, we assume that {αi} of PoW,
PoS, and PoA follow the Pareto distribution; PoP follows the normal distribu-455
tion. To be specific, we implement Proof-of-Collaboration (PoC) [5]3, for the
simulation of both strongly restricted and weakly restricted coinage-based PoS
consensuses.
We implement a typical type of Fairness-oriented PoS-Velocity with a Pareto
distribution in the simulation, where the Fairness function Υ(ωi) = ζ(ωi) and460
the Degree function Φ(·) = µ(min{·}) are used4. Here, we use the definition
3This consensus defines two new parameters, CC and PPoC . The winner of each round of
generating the new block will earn CC, while PPoC is defined as the time since the last CC
changes. On the other hand, PPoC ∈ [L,R], where L can be constant during a long-term
period and R = 3L. Also, PPoC of the winner is set to 0 for the next single round (so that
PPoC starts from 0). Therefore, the PoC consensus can be regarded as a variant of strongly
restricted coinage-based PoS and fn,h = αn min{h − 1, H}, where 1 ≤ h ≤ H, h = PPoC ,
h = 1 = L, h− 1 = 0, H = R. In addition, the PoC consensus can be with a weak restriction
if we set PPoC to L instead of 0.
4An example is that, ζ(·) can be a partition function where the lower and upper bound
are pre-defined to avoid the monopoly and starvation; µ(·) can be a non-linear function where
the gradient g remains flat from the beginning up to a threshold, followed by a sharp increase
after the threshold (so that the poor miners can be more likely to win).
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in [3] of PoS-Velocity. That is the linear Φ(·) is substituted by other forms of
Degree functions, e.g., a non-linear function µ(·); the Fairness function is set to
the form of a partition function, e.g., ζ(·).
5.2. Simulation Result465
First, the scope of our proposed model in terms of the margin of error is dis-
cussed. After that, the proposed metrics, Resource Sensitivity, System Conver-
gence, and Resource Fairness are simulated among the (non-)Fairness-oriented
PoX schemes listed in Table 1. Finally, we deliver the implicit findings for
miners to evaluate PoX schemes in different scenarios based on the proposed470
model.
5.2.1. Accuracy of the proposed model - margin of error
To investigate the accuracy of the estimation derived from our model and pos-
sible factors impacting on such accuracy, we consider two types of margin of475
errors in this section.
• Standard Error (S). It is also known as the standard error of the esti-
mate, representing the average distance between the estimated values and
observed values. Smaller S implies a better fitted model.
• Adjusted R-squared (ARSQ) [27]. ARSQ is known as the adjusted480
coefficient of determination in statistics, representing the ratio of the vari-
ance in the dependent variable that is predictable from the independent
variable(s) with considering the number of independent variable(s). It is
often used to assess how good the estimated model fit the observed values,
the closer to 1 the better. Note that, in our simulation ARSQ is a com-485
plemented metrics to S as a non-linear model may imply an inaccuracy
due to the unexpected over-fitting. A high-ARSQ indicates a good fitting
only if S is within the acceptable range. In contrast, we can still reliably
approximate the trend with a high-ARSQ when S is slightly higher than
the range.490
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(a) fi,h = αmin{h,H}













(b) fi,h = αmin{h− 1, H}
Figure 3: π(h) of the outlier with a Pareto distributed system resource for coinage-based PoS





An invalid π(H) that is negative appears when h = H.
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Figure 4: The margin of error with the growth of the resource ratio owned by an arbitrary




, in terms of both S and ARSQ.
Here, the system resource is Pareto distributed. Note that the ratio is the system resource
ratio that a specific outlier miner owns.
Our analytical model is applicable to Pareto distributions (that is the worst
case), where the outlier owns up to 50% of the system resource that is equal to
the FT of all PoX schemes. An outlier denotes Node-i that owns the majority
of the Pareto-distributed system resource. For example, in the following list if
N = 10,
ω = [0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.55],
where the n-th element in the list is the ratio of the amount of system resource
of Node-i. The node with ω = 0.55 is defined as the outlier.
According to Fig. 3, when fi,h = αimin{h,H} (see Fig. 3(a)) and αimin{h−
1, H} (see Fig. 3(b)), the invalid negative π(i,H) appears at h = H, as the ratio
of system resource owned by Node-i increases.495
Fig. 4 shows the correlation of the resource ratio owned by the outlier, with
the two types of margin of error between the estimated and simulated values.
It shows that ARSQ of all considered fi,h remains closed to 1, which results
in a good fitting if S is within the acceptable range. S remains low when the
ratio of the amount of system resource is less than 50% for all considered fi,h.500
Also, S increases exponentially as the ratio increases for fi,h = αi (the blue
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Figure 5: The margin of error with the growth of t
T





terms of both S and ARSQ. Here, the system resource is Pareto distributed with the ratio of
the amount of system resource owned by a specific outlier miner is 33%.
line). Thus, it can be concluded that, the proposed model suits in the Pareto
distribution with an outlier owning up to ∼ 50% resource, but does not suit
an accurate prediction for a Pareto-distributed system with an outlier that is
too fart apart (greater than ∼ 50%), except for algorithms satisfying Resource505
Fairness (referring to the example of PoS-Velocity shown in Table 1). In spite of
this, the proposed model can still be reliable on approximating the trend. Note
that the smallest outlier has satisfied the required FT (N ≥ 2f + 1), where f is
the number of faulty miners. This consequently leads to an acceptable range of
S for the accuracy of the proposed model, i.e., 3%.510
Fig. 5 shows the correlation of tT with the two types of margin of error
between the estimated and simulated values. By investigating what range of
t
T the margin of error can be acceptable, we can subsequently determine the
upper bound of tT which can tolerate the possible deviation in (2). It shows




600 (Bitcoin point, 95% confident interval) [1, 28], decrease smoothly when
t
T ≤ 0.8, and incur a sharp decrease onwards. S of fi,h = αi min{h,H} and
fi,h = αi min{h− 1, H} remain closed to the 3% range when tT falls around the
Bitcoin point, which still results in a reliable trend-approximation. However, S
28
of fi,h = αi (the blue line) supports the reliable trend-approximation only if
t
T520
stands around the Bitcoin point, and incurs a sharp increase onwards. The same
circumstance happens for fi,h = αi min{h,H} and fi,h = αi min{h− 1, H} if tT
is greater than the Bitcoin point. Thus, it can be concluded that, the proposed
model supports a reliable trend-approximation for tT that is smaller than the
Bitcoin point.525
Validated by Figs. 3 to 5, it can be further concluded that
• the model is accurate if the FT of PoX schemes is satisfied with either
Pareto-distributed or normal-distributed resource;
• the model can provide a reliable trend-approximation when tT is suffi-
ciently small (the network latency is comparatively negligible to the block530
period), which corresponds to the circumstance of a well-connected net-
work with low latency in the real world.
5.2.2. Resource sensitivity
We simulate the process ranging from PoW to PoP, and both of the coinage-535
based PoS with strong and weak restrictions, as shown in Table 1. Also, the
corresponding calculated values are obtained by calculating (13) under different
settings of fi,h.
Finding 1: The coinage-based PoS (Strong restriction) [18, 5] has the best per-540
formance on Resource Sensitivity among our considered non-Fairness-oriented
PoX schemes.
This finding is revealed in Fig. 6, where P is subject to the ratio of the
amount of system resource. An identity line regardless of the distribution type
is obtained for fi,h = αi (the dark blue line), i.e., zero-Resource-sensitive. Note545
that Pi is collectively generalized as P among the miners. The light blue curve
of fi,h = αimin{h − 1, H} appears to have a better performance on Resource




Figure 6: The correlation between the resource ratio and the average block probability P,





of strong restriction rather than weak restriction. Referring to Section 2.1, it
can be concluded that the cost for attackers to catch up with the honest miners550
can be higher with fi,h = αimin{h − 1, H} or fi,h = αimin{h,H} than only
fi,h = αi.
Finding 2: The poor (i.e., the less resourceful miners) can gain more profit
with a positive Degree function (that increases the mining probability by mul-555
tiplying the resource ratio and the awaiting gap) [19, 18, 5]. In contrast, the
obtained profit becomes lower for the rich with the increased ratio of resource
owned.
Based on Fig. 6, it is conceivable that poor miners can obtain a greater
gradient g than wealthy miners (positive-Resource-sensitivity), in the case of560
fi,h = αimin{h− 1, H} (the light blue line) and αimin{h,H} (the purple line)
with a Pareto-distributed resource. There exists a threshold intercepting the
identity line, to the left of which the gradient m is greater so that poor miners
can obtain a larger P than they used to deserve with only fi,h = αi (the dark
blue line). Likewise, wealthy miners, i.e., the outliers, can only obtain a smaller565
g than that of fi,h = αi. This implies a mechanism that taking from the wealthy
to help the poor to balance the profits among the whole participated miners.
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5.2.3. System convergence
We proceed to evaluate System Convergence of the considered PoX schemes,570
where each of them runs for 1,000 tries. In each of the schemes, the system
starts from the same initial state. We name the number of rounds required to
reach the steady-state system convergence period. During this simulation, we
set that the steady-state is reached once the gap between the calculated and
the simulation value of Ti decreases down to 3% (the explanation of 3% refers575
to the definition of System Convergence in Section 3.4).
Finding 3: For PoX schemes disabling the Fairness function, 80/20-rule-based
wealth inequality deteriorates System Convergence, compared to normal-distributed
wealth inequality.580
This finding is shown in Fig. 7, where a Pareto distribution applying to
fi,h = αi (the brown box) takes the longest time to reach the steady-state,
while it converges the most quickly with a normal-distributed resource (the
purple box). Thus, PoP resulting in a normal-distributed resource has the low-
est number of rounds to reach the steady-state, compared with those with a585
Pareto-distributed resource. This is because of the outlier of Pareto-distributed
resource overwhelmingly dominates the mining process.
Finding 4: The system convergence period can be reduced by enabling Resource
Fairness and applying a positive Degree function (that increases the mining prob-590
ability by multiplying the resource ratio and the awaiting gap).
According to Fig. 7, it can be found that fi,h = αi min{h,H} (the green
box) with an active Fairness function needs fewer rounds to reach the stead-
state than that of fi,h = αi min{h,H} (the blue box) with an inactive Fairness
function. On the other hand, fi,h = αi (the brown box) with Degree function595
Φ(·) = 1 has longer system convergence period than the blue box with a positive
Degree function. This is because the active Fairness function and positive Degree
31
Figure 7: The comparison among the four different PoX schemes in terms of System Conver-





function apply a stronger restriction to the Monte Carlo variables, compared to
those without an inactive Fairness function.
5.2.4. Resource fairness600
Fig. 6 shows that none of the considered PoX schemes (except the red dot line) is
upper bounded and Fairness-oriented, as the Pi of wealth miners remain a linear
increasing based on the resource ratio owned by each miner. In other words,
Resource Fairness is inactive for these PoX schemes, while Resource Fairness605
holds in some circumstances (i.e., Υ(ωi) 6= ωi, to meet different requirements)
for the Fairness-oriented PoS-Velocity listed in Table 1, referring to the red dot
line in Fig. 6 and green box in Fig. 7. In this section, we show how Resource
Fairness “encourages” such kind of PoX schemes to achieve better performance
of Resource Sensitivity and System Convergence.610
Recall that we implement a typical type of PoS-Velocity (see Section 5.1) as
an example of a Fairness-oriented PoX scheme. It is revealed in Fig. 6, where the
considered PoS-Velocity has the best performance on Resource Sensitive (i.e.,
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the smallest E(g)) among all of the considered PoX schemes. In addition to the
better performance of Resource Sensitivity, P remains constant when the upper615
bound is met with a partition function ζ(ω). In other words, Resource Fairness
can be satisfied with a simple linear Υ(ωi) being substituted by the design of a
partitioned Υ(ωi) = ζ(ω). Thus, the considered PoS-Velocity prevents wealthy
miners from monopolizing the entire network and incentivizes all miners to
participate in the mining process and getting rewards.620
Furthermore, the 80/20-rule-based wealth inequality can be addressed by
the considered PoS-Velocity. Fig. 7 shows that System Convergence of the
considered PoS-Velocity with a Pareto distribution (the green box) performs
as good as that of PoP, i.e., fi,h = αi with a normal-distributed resource (the
purple box).625
It turns out that by enabling Resource Fairness with the designed Υ(·) and
Φ(·), the considered PoS-Velocity achieves,
• best Resource Sensitivity : the best performance on Resource Sensitivity
among any other non-Fairness-oriented PoX schemes listed in Table 1,
based on the red dot line in Fig. 6;630
• improved System Convergence: a performance on System Convergence
that is as good as that of PoP with a normal-distributed resource, based
on the comparison between the purple and green boxes shown in Fig. 7.
5.2.5. Summary
635
To sum up, apart from the considered PoS-Velocity scheme (defined in Sec-
tion 5.1), other Fairness-oriented PoS-Velocity schemes can also reveal their
optimized Resource Sensitivity and System Convergence by using our model.
This can be achieved as long as the proper Υ(·) and Φ(·) are set (e.g., partition
Υ(·) and non-linear Φ(·)). By using the proposed model, we reveal that care-640
fully designed Resource Fairness is particularly important to balance Resource
Sensitivity, and System Convergence of PoX-based consensus algorithms in the
33
long-term steady-state. Such steady-state analysis and findings have not been
possible without our model.
6. Related Work645
There have been several studies proposing analytical models to evaluate the
consensus engine of Nakamoto protocol, focusing on PoW from the beginning.
Garay et al. proposed a model with negligible network delay and constant
total mining power [20] for PoW. Miller and LaViola proposed an analytical
model for PoW in terms of the faulty tolerance within a reliant synchronization650
network [10]. [29] proposes a specific security model regarding the adversarial
strategies (selfish mining) considered in [30]. Also, in [31], a security analysis of
PoW based on a partially synchronous network is proposed in terms of both the
consistency and network partition. On top of that, [13] thoroughly discussed the
security issue of PoW, which mainly focuses on natural/malicious consistency655
problems due to the considerable block propagation time. Apart from a few
papers claiming the randomized consensus [12] and the PoX schemes [3, 4] from
which the concept of PoX-based consensus algorithms originate, there are not as
many as papers generalizing the PoW/PoS consensus algorithms. They tend to
be a model where only PoW, PoS, or any other variants are compared [32, 33, 34].660
The above models focus on attacks based on the weakness of incentive
schemes due to natural/malicious network partitions caused by the consider-
able block propagation time, such as the selfish-mining-attack, eclipse-attack
and computational double-spending attack in PoW [13], and nothing-at-stake
attack and long-range attack in PoS [33]. None of them focuses on the resource665
distribution, to evaluate how much different settings of the weighted system
resource distribution will impact the long-term steady-state, and provides an
analytical model to each individual miner for a long-term risk assessment, i.e.,
the amount of profits can be earned if being a miner to pay the system resource.
It is worth noting that, [13] proposed the pitfalls in existing security models670
that the unrealistic parameters range may prevent the vulnerabilities from being
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discovered in the first place and mislead researches into only focusing on a
single attack strategy and incentive. This is indeed acceptable, nevertheless, the
resource distribution can be analyzed separately from all the other parameters
caused by the network delay and non-zero block propagation time; refer to675
Algo. 4 in [20]. In our model, we simplify our scenario and focus on the security
only impacted by the resource distribution without taking the network delay
([20] considers the same assumption) and any corresponding attack strategies
and incentives caused by the delay into account. Such a model we proposed
can still allow miners to estimate the profits by the proposed metric, Resource680
Sensitivity, as shown in Section 3.4.1.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
We developed a new infinite-dimensional Markov model to unify the steady-
state analysis for weighted resource distribution of different PoX-based Blockcha-
ins in large-scale networks. The probability of an arbitrary node being elected685
as the block generator was derived. Based on the analytical model, we eval-
uated PoW, balance-based and coinage-based PoS, PoA and PoP, in terms of
Resource Sensitivity, System Convergence, and Resource Fairness. We also as-
sessed a typical PoS-Velocity scheme with a weight consisting of the proper set
Fairness function and Degree function, and showed the balanced performance of690
the scheme in regards to all the three metrics. Extensive simulation results also
prove that the applicability and generality of the model. This can significantly
encourage the adoption of Blockchain in large-scale networks that provide public
services to the communities.
In the future, we will optimize the margin of error of the model and study695
the short-term impact of the accumulated resource of each miner upon the entire
system. Our model can potentially provide an effective benchmark to evaluate
and compare different PoX-based consensus algorithms from a broader aspect.
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